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 Cosmopolitanism is concerned to disclose the ethical, cultural and legal basis 
of political order in a world where political communities and states matter, but not 
only and exclusively. In circumstances where the trajectories of each and every 
country are tightly entwined, the partiality, one sidedness and limitedness of ‘reasons 
of state’ need to be recognized. While states are hugely important vehicles to aid 
the delivery of effective public recognition, equal liberty and social justice, they 
should not be thought of as ontologically privileged. They can be judged by how 
far they deliver these public goods and how far they fail; for the history of states 
is marked, of course, not just by phases of bad leadership and corruption but also 
by the most brutal episodes. A cosmopolitanism relevant to our global age must 
take this as a starting point, and build an ethically sound and politically robust 
conception of the proper basis of political community, and of the relations among 
communities.1
 Two accounts of cosmopolitanism bear on its contemporary meaning. The first 
was set out by the Stoics who were the first to refer explicitly to themselves as 
cosmopolitans, seeking to replace the central role of the polis in ancient political 
thought with that of the cosmos in which humankind might live together in harmony 
(Horstmann, 1976). The Stoics developed this thought by emphasizing that we inhabit 
two worlds — one which is local and assigned to us by birth and another which is 
‘truly great and truly common’ (Seneca). Each person lives in a local community 
and in a wider community of human ideals, aspirations and argument. The basis 
of the latter lies in what is fundamental to all — the equal worth of reason and 
humanity in every person (Nussbaum, 1997, pp. 30, 43). Allegiance is owed, first 
and foremost, to the moral realm of all humanity, not to the contingent groupings 
of nation, ethnicity and class. Deliberation and problem solving should focus on 
what is common to all persons as citizens of reason and the world; collective 
problems can be better dealt with if approached from this perspective, rather than 
from the point of view of sectional groupings. Such a position does not require 
that individuals give up local concerns and affiliations to family, friends and fe-
llow countrymen; it implies, instead, that they must acknowledge these as morally 
contingent and that their most important duties are to humanity as a whole and its 
overall developmental requirements.
 1. I would like to thank Gillian Brock for inviting me to prepare this paper. The section on 
cosmopolitan principles draws on earlier work of mine (2002, 2004) but seeks to elaborate and extend 
this material in an argument about the scope and status of cosmopolitanism today. I would also like 
to thank the Leverhulme Trust for supporting the work of which this essay is a part.
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 The second conception of cosmopolitanism was introduced in the eighteenth 
century when the term weltbürger (world citizen) became one of the key terms of 
the Enlightenment. The most important contribution to this body of thought can 
be found in Kant’s writings (above all, 1970, pp. 41-53, 54-60 and 93-130). Kant 
linked the idea of cosmopolitanism to an innovative conception of ‘the public use 
of reason’, and explored the ways in which this conception of reason can generate 
a critical vantage point from which to scrutinize civil society (see Schmidt, 1998, 
pp. 419-427). Building on a definition of enlightenment as the escape from dogma 
and unvindicated authority, Kant measured its advance in terms of the removal of 
constraints on ‘the public use of reason’. As one commentator eloquently remarked, 
Kant grounds reason ‘in the reputation of principles that preclude the possibility 
of open-ended interaction and communication… The principles of reason are those 
that can secure the possibility of intersubjectivity’ (O’Neill, 1990, p. 194). Kant 
conceived of participation in a cosmopolitan (weltbürgerlich) society as an entit-
lement — an entitlement to enter the world of open, uncoerced dialogue —and he 
adapted this idea in his formulation of what he called ‘cosmopolitan right’ (1970, 
pp. 105-8). Cosmopolitan right meant the capacity to present oneself and be heard 
within and across political communities; it was the right to enter dialogue without 
artificial constraint and delimitation. 
 Contemporary conceptions of cosmopolitanism can be found in the work of 
Beitz, Pogge and Barry, among others (see, in particular, Beitz, 1979, 1994, 1998; 
Pogge, 1989, 1994a, 1994b; and Barry, 1998a and 1999). In certain respects, this 
work seems to explicate, and offer a compelling elucidation of, the classical con-
ception of belonging to the human community first and foremost, and the Kantian 
conception of subjecting all beliefs, relations and practices to the test of whether 
or not they allow for uncoerced interaction and impartial reasoning. In the sections 
that follow, I will draw on some of this writing and use it as a basis to set out the 
outlines of a comprehensive account of the principles of cosmopolitanism —their 
nature, status, justification and political implications. I begin by stating the prin-
ciples and explain how they cluster into three types. I then go on to explore their 
standing and scope.
COSMOPOLITAN PRINCIPLES
 Cosmopolitan values can be expressed formally in terms of a set of principles 
(see Held, 2002, 2004). These are principles which can be universally shared, and can 
form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person’s equal significance 
in ‘the moral realm of all humanity’. Eight principles are paramount. They are the 
principles of: 1. equal worth and dignity; 2. active agency; 3. personal responsibility 
and accountability; 4. consent; 5. collective decision-making about public matters 
through voting procedures; 6. inclusiveness and subsidiarity; 7. avoidance of serious 
harm; and 8. sustainability. The meaning of these principles needs unpacking in 
order that their nature and implications can be clarified. While eight principles may 
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seem like a daunting number, they are interrelated and together form the basis of 
a cosmopolitan orientation.
 The first principle is that the ultimate units of moral concern are individual 
human beings, not states or other particular forms of human association. Humankind 
belongs to a single moral realm in which each person is regarded as equally worthy 
of respect and consideration (Beitz, 1994; Pogge, 1994a). To think of people as 
having equal moral value is to make a general claim about the basic units of the 
world comprising persons as free and equal beings (see Kuper, 2000). This notion 
can be referred to as the principle of individualist moral egalitarianism or, simply, 
egalitarian individualism. To uphold this principle is not to deny the significance 
of cultural diversity and difference —not at all— but it is to affirm that there are 
limits to the moral validity of particular communities —limits which recognize, 
and demand, that we must treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and moral 
choice in every human being (Nussbaum, 1997, pp 42-3). In the post-Holocaust 
world, these limits have been recognized in the UN Charter, in the human rights 
regime, among many other legal instruments (see Held, 2004, part III).
 The second principle recognizes that, if principle one is to be universally 
recognized and accepted, then human agency cannot be understood as the mere 
expression of a given teleology, fortune or tradition; rather, human agency must be 
conceived as the ability to act otherwise —the ability not just to accept but to shape 
human community in the context of the choices of others. Active agency connotes 
the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and 
to be self-determining.2 It bestows both opportunities and duties —opportunities 
to act (or not as the case may be), and duties to ensure that independent action 
does not curtail and infringe upon the life chances and opportunities of others 
(unless, of course, sanctioned by negotiation or consent: see below). Active agency 
is a capacity both to make and pursue claims and to have such claims made and 
pursued in relation to oneself. Each person has an equal interest in active agency 
or self-determination.
 Principles 1 and 2 cannot be grasped fully unless supplemented by principle 
3: the principle of personal responsibility and accountability. At its most basic, this 
principle can be understood to mean that it is inevitable that people will choose 
different cultural, social and economic projects and that such differences need to be 
recognized. People develop their skills and talents differently, and enjoy different 
forms of ability and specialized competency. That they fare differently, and that 
many of these differences arise from a voluntary choice on their part, should be 
welcomed and accepted (see Barry, 1998a, pp. 147-9). These prima facie legitima-
te differences of choice and outcome have to be distinguished from unacceptable 
 2. The principle of active agency does not make any assumption about the extent of self-
knowledge or reflexivity. Clearly, this varies and can be shaped by both unacknowledged conditions 
and unintended consequences of action (see Giddens, 1984). It does, however, assume that the course 
of agency is a course that includes choice and that agency itself is, in essence, defined by the capacity 
to act otherwise.
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structures of difference which reflect conditions which prevent, or partially prevent, 
the pursuit by some of their vital needs. Actors have to be aware of, and accoun-
table for, the consequences of actions, direct or indirect, intended or unintended, 
which may radically restrict or delimit the choices of others. Individuals have both 
personal responsibility-rights as well as personal responsibility-obligations.3
 The fourth principle, the principle of consent, recognizes that a commitment 
to equal worth and equal moral value, along with active agency and personal res-
ponsibility, requires a non-coercive political process in and through which people 
can negotiate and pursue their public interconnections, interdependencies and life 
chances. Interlocking lives, projects and communities require forms of public 
reasoning, deliberation and decision-making which take account of each person’s 
equal standing in such processes. The principle of consent constitutes the basis of 
non-coercive collective agreement and governance.
 Principles 4 and 5 must be interpreted together. For principle 5 acknowledges 
that while a legitimate public decision is one that results from consent, this needs 
to be linked with voting at the decisive stage of collective decision-making and with 
the procedures and mechanisms of majority rule. The consent of all is too strong 
a requirement of collective decision-making and the basis on which minorities 
can block or forestall public responses to key issues (see Held, 2002, pp. 26-7). 
Principle 5 recognizes the importance of inclusiveness in the process of granting 
consent, while interpreting this to mean that an inclusive process of participation 
and debate can coalesce with a decision-making procedure which allows outcomes 
which accrue the greatest support (Dahl, 1989).4
 The sixth principle, which I earlier referred to as the principle of inclusive-
ness and subsidiarity, seeks to clarify the fundamental criterion of drawing proper 
boundaries around units of collective decision-making, and on what grounds. At its 
simplest, it connotes that those significantly affected by public decisions, issues or 
processes, should, ceteris paribus, have an equal opportunity, directly or indirec-
tly through elected representatives, to influence and shape them. By significantly 
affected I mean that people are enmeshed in decisions and forces that impact on 
their capacity to fulfil their vital needs (see Held, 2004, chapter 6). According to 
principle 6, collective decision-making is best located when it is closest to and 
involves those whose life expectancy and life chances are determined by significant 
 3. The obligations taken on in this context cannot, of course, all be fulfilled with the same types 
of initiative (personal, social or political) or at the same level (local, national or global). But whatever 
their mode of realization, all such efforts can be related to one common denominator: the concern 
to discharge obligations we take on by virtue of the claims we make for the recognition of personal 
responsibility-rights (cf. Raz, 1986, chs. 14-15).
 4. Minorities clearly need to be protected in this process. The rights and obligations entailed by 
principles 4 and 5 have to be compatible with the protection of each person’s equal interest in principles 
1, 2 and 3 —an interest which follows from each person’s recognition as being of equal worth, with 
an equal capacity to act and to account for their actions. Majorities ought not to be able to impose 
themselves arbitrarily upon others. Principles 4 and 5 have to be understood against the background 
specified by the first three principles; the latter frame the basis of their operation.
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social processes and forces. On the other hand, this principle also recognizes that 
if the decisions at issue are translocal, transnational or transregional, then political 
associations need not only be locally based but also to have a wider scope and 
framework of operation.
 The seventh principle is a leading principle of social justice: the principle of 
the avoidance of harm and the amelioration of urgent need. This is a principle for 
allocating priority to the most vital cases of need and, where possible, trumping 
other, less urgent public priorities until such a time as all human beings, de facto 
and de jure, are covered by the first six principles; that is to say, until they enjoy 
the status of equal moral value, active agency and have the means to participate 
in their respective political communities and in the overlapping communities of 
fate which shape their needs and welfare. A social provision which falls short of 
the potential for active agency can be referred to as a situation of manifest harm 
in that the participatory potential of individuals and groups will not have been 
achieved; that is to say, people would not have adequate access to effectively re-
sourced capacities which they might make use of in their particular circumstances 
(Sen, 1999). But even this significant shortfall in the realization of human potential 
should be distinguished from situations of the most pressing levels of vulnerability, 
defined by the most urgent need. The harm that follows from a failure to meet such 
needs can be denoted as serious harm, marked as it often is by immediate, life-
and-death consequences. Accordingly, if the requirements specified by the principle 
of avoidance of serious harm are to be met, public policy ought to be focused, in 
the first instance, on the prevention of such conditions; that is, on the eradication 
of severe harm inflicted on people ‘against their will’ and ‘without their consent’ 
(Barry, 1998a, pp. 231, 207).
 The eighth and final principle is the principle of sustainability which specifies 
that all economic and social development must be consistent with the stewardship 
of the world’s core resources —by which I mean resources which are irreplaceable 
and non-substitutable (Goodin, 1992, pp. 62-65, 72). Such a principle discriminates 
against social and economic change which disrupts global ecological balances and 
unnecessarily damages the choices of future generations. Sustainable development 
is best understood as a guiding principle, as opposed to a precise formula, since 
we do not know, for example, how future technological innovation will impact on 
resource provision and utilization. Yet, without reference to such a principle, public 
policy would be made without taking account of the finite quality of many of the 
world’s resources and the equally valid claims of future generations to well-being. 
Because the contemporary economic and military age is the first age to be able 
to take decisions not just for itself but for all future epochs, its choices must be 
particularly careful not to pre-empt the equal worth and active agency of future 
generations.
 The eight principles can best be thought of as falling into three clusters. The 
first cluster (principles 1-3) sets down the fundamental organizational features of 
the cosmopolitan moral universe. Its crux is that each person is subject of equal 
moral concern; that each person is capable of acting autonomously with respect 
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to the range of choices before them; and that, in deciding how to act or which 
institutions to create, the claims of each person affected should be taken equally 
into account. Personal responsibility means in this context that actors and agents 
have to be aware of, and accountable for, the consequences of their actions, direct 
or indirect, intended or unintended, which may substantially restrict and delimit 
the opportunities of others. The second cluster (principles 4-6) forms the basis of 
translating individually initiated activity, or privately determined activities more 
broadly, into collectively agreed or collectively sanctioned frameworks of action 
or regulatory regimes. Public power at all levels can be conceived as legitimate to 
the degree to which principles 4, 5 and 6 are upheld. The final principles (7 and 
8) lay down a framework for prioritizing urgent need and resource conservation. 
By distinguishing vital from non-vital needs, principle 7 creates an unambiguous 
starting point and guiding orientation for public decisions. While this ‘prioritizing 
commitment’ does not, of course, create a decision procedure to resolve all clashes 
of priority in politics, it clearly creates a moral framework for focusing public po-
licy on those who are most vulnerable. By contrast, principle 8 seeks to set down 
a prudential orientation to help ensure that public policy is consistent with global 
ecological balances and that it does not destroy irreplaceable and non-substitutable 
resources.
THICK OR THIN COSMOPOLITANISM?
 It could be objected at this point that, given the plurality of interpretive stan-
dpoints in the contemporary world (social, cultural, religious and so on), it is unwise 
to construct a political philosophy which depends upon overarching principles. For 
it is doubtful, the objection could continue, that a bridge can be built between ‘the 
many particular wills’ and ‘the general will’ (see McCarthy, 1991, pp. 181-99). In 
a world marked by a diversity of value orientations, on what grounds, if any, can 
we suppose that all groups or parties could be argumentatively convinced about 
fundamentally ethical and political principles?
 It is important to stress that cosmopolitan philosophy does not deny the reality 
and ethical relevance of living in a world of diverse values and identities —how 
could it? It does not assume that unanimity is attainable on all practical-political 
questions. The elaboration of cosmopolitan principles is not an exercise in seeking 
a general and universal understanding on a wide spectrum of issues concerning the 
broad conditions of life or diverse ethical matters (for example, abortion, animal 
rights or the role of voluntary euthanasia). This is not how a modern cosmopolitan 
project should be understood. Rather, at stake is a more restrictive exercise aimed 
at reflecting on the moral status of persons, the conditions of agency, and collective 
decision-making. It is important to emphasize that this exercise is constructed on the 
assumption that ground rules for communication, dialogue and dispute settlement 
are not only desirable but essential precisely because all people are of equal moral 
value and their views on a wide range of moral-political questions will conflict. 
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The principles of cosmopolitanism are the conditions of taking cultural diversity 
seriously and of building a democratic culture to mediate clashes of the cultural 
good. They are, in short, about the conditions of just difference and democratic 
dialogue. The aim of modern cosmopolitanism is the conceptualization and gene-
ration of the necessary background conditions for a ‘common’ or ‘basic’ structure 
of individual action and social activity (cf. Rawls, 1985, pp. 254ff).
 Contemporary cosmopolitans, it should be acknowledged, are divided about 
the demands that cosmopolitanism lays upon the individual and, accordingly, upon 
the appropriate framing of the necessary background conditions for a ‘common’ 
structure of individual action and social activity. Among them there is agreement 
that in deciding how to act, or which rules or regulations ought to be established, 
the claims of each person affected should be weighed equally —‘no matter where 
they live, which society they belong to, or how they are connected to us’ (Miller, 
1998, p. 165). The principle of egalitarian individualism is regarded as axiomatic. 
But the moral weight granted to this principle depends heavily upon the precise 
modes of interpretation of other principles.
 Two broad positions exist in the literature. There are those for whom membership 
of humanity at large means that special relationships (including particular moral 
responsibilities) to family, kin, nation or religious grouping can never be justified 
because the people involved have some intrinsic quality which suffices alone to 
compel special moral attention, or because they are allegedly worth more than other 
people, or because such affiliations provide sufficient reason for pursuing particu-
lar commitments or actions. This does not mean that such relationships cannot be 
justified —they can, but only in so far as nurturing or honoring such ties is in the 
cosmopolitan interest; that is, is the best way to achieve the good for humanity 
overall (Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 135-6; Barry, 1998a). As Scheffler succinctly put it, 
‘special attention to particular people is legitimate only if it can be justified by re-
ference to the interests of all human beings considered as equals’ (1999, p. 259).
 The second interpretation recognizes that while each person stands in ‘an ethi-
cally significant relation’ to all other people, this is only one important ‘source of 
reasons and responsibilities among others’ (Scheffler, 1999, p. 260). Cosmopolitan 
principles are, in this context, quite compatible with the recognition of different 
‘spheres’ or ‘layers’ of moral reasoning (Walzer, 1983).
 In the light of this, it is useful to draw a distinction between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ cosmopolitanism, or between thick and thin cosmopolitanism as I refer to 
it. Miller has summarized the distinction well:
According to the strong [thick] version… [a]ll moral principles must be justified 
by showing that they give equal weight to the claims of everyone, which means 
that they must either be directly universal in their scope, or if they apply only to a 
select group of people they must be secondary principles whose ultimate founda-
tion is universal. The weak [thin] version, by contrast, holds only that morality is 
cosmopolitan in part: there are some valid principles with a more restricted scope. 
According to… [thin] cosmopolitanism…we may owe certain kinds of treatment to 
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all other human beings regardless of any relationship in which we stand to them, 
while there are other kinds of treatment that we owe only to those to whom we 
are related in certain ways, with neither sort of obligation being derivative of the 
other (1998, pp. 166-7).
 Whether cosmopolitanism is an overriding frame of reference (trumping all 
other moral positions) or a distinctive subset of considerations (specifying that there 
are some substantive global rules, norms and principles of justice which ought to 
be balanced with, and take account of, those derived from individual societies or 
other human groupings) is not a question which will be focused on here at length 
(cf. Barry, 1998a; Miller, 1998). However, some comment is in order if the rationale 
and standing of the eight principles are to be satisfactorily illuminated.
 I take cosmopolitanism ultimately to denote the ethical and political space 
occupied by the 8 principles. Cosmopolitanism lays down the universal or regula-
tive principles which delimit and govern the range of diversity and difference that 
ought to be found in public life. It discloses the proper basis or framework for the 
pursuit of argument, discussion and negotiation about particular spheres of value, 
spheres in which local, national and regional affiliations will inevitably be weighed. 
In some respects, this is a form of thick cosmopolitanism. However, it should not be 
concluded from this that the meaning of the eight principles can simply be specified 
once and for all. For while cosmopolitanism affirms principles which are universal 
in their scope, it recognizes, in addition, that the precise meaning of these is always 
fleshed out in situated discussions; in other words, that there is an inescapable 
hermeneutic complexity in moral and political affairs which will affect how the 8 
principles are actually interpreted, and the weight granted to special ties and other 
practical-political issues. I call this mix of regulative principles and interpretative 
activity neither thick nor thin cosmopolitanism, but, rather, a ‘layered’ cosmopolitan 
perspective (cf. Tully, 1995). This cosmopolitan point-of-view builds on principles 
that all could reasonably assent to, while recognizing the irreducible plurality of 
forms of life (Habermas, 1996). Thus, on the one hand, the position upholds certain 
basic egalitarian ideas —those which emphasize equal worth, equal respect, equal 
consideration and so on— and, on the other, it acknowledges that the elucidation 
of their meaning cannot be pursued independently of an ongoing dialogue in public 
life. Hence, there can be no adequate institutionalization of equal rights and duties 
without a corresponding institutionalization of national and transnational forms of 
public debate, democratic participation and accountability (McCarthy, 1999). The 
institutionalization of regulative cosmopolitan principles requires the entrenchment 
of democratic public realms.
 A layered cosmopolitan perspective of this kind shares a particular commitment 
with thin cosmopolitanism in so far as it acknowledges a plurality of value sources 
and a diversity of moral conceptions of the good; it recognizes, accordingly, di-
fferent spheres of ethical reasoning linked to everyday attempts to resolve matters 
concerning modes of living and social organization (Böhme, 2001). As such, it 
seeks to express ethical neutrality with regard to many life questions. But ethical 
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neutrality of this sort should not be confused with political neutrality and its core 
requirements (see Kuper, 2000, p.649f). The point has been succinctly stated by 
Tan: ‘a commitment to ethical neutrality entails a particular type of political arran-
gement, one which, for one, allows for the pursuit of different private conceptions 
of the good’ (1998, p.283, quoted in Kuper, 2000, p.649; see Barry, 1995, p.263). 
Only polities that acknowledge the equal status of all persons, that seek neutra-
lity or impartiality with respect to personal ends, hopes and aspirations, and that 
pursue the public justification of social, economic and political arrangements can 
ensure a basic or common structure of political action which allows individuals to 
pursue their projects —both individual and collective— as free and equal agents. 
Such a structure is inconsistent with, and, if applied systematically, would need to 
filter out, those ends and goods, whether public or private, which would erode or 
undermine the structure itself.5 For value pluralism and social pluralism to flourish, 
political associations must be structured or organized in one general way —that 
is, according to the constituting, legitimizing and prioritizing principles specified 
above (cf. Pogge, 1994, p. 127). Arguments can be had about the exact specification 
of these; that is, about how these notions are properly formulated. But the eight 
principles themselves constitute guiding notions or regulative ideals for a polity 
geared to autonomy, dialogue and tolerance.
COSMOPOLITAN JUSTIFICATIONS
 However, while cosmopolitanism must stand by these principles, they are not, 
of course, self-justifying. Or, to put the point another way, whence these principles? 
From the outset, it is important to distinguish two things too often run together: 
questions about the origins of principles, and questions about their validity or weig-
ht (see Weale, 1998). Both kinds of question are relevant. If the first illuminates 
the ethical circumstances or motivation for a preference for, or commitment to, a 
principle or set of principles, the second is the basis for testing their intersubjective 
validity. In this regard, the justificatory rationale of cosmopolitan principles is depen-
dent on two fundamental metaprinciples or organizing notions of ethical discourse 
—one cultural and historical, the other philosophical. These are, respectively, the 
metaprinciple of autonomy and the metaprinciple of impartialist reasoning.
 The metaprinciple of autonomy (henceforth, the MPA) is at the core of the 
democratic project. Its rationale and standing are ‘political not metaphysical’, to 
borrow a phrase from Rawls (1985). A basic concept or idea is political, in this sense, 
if it represents an articulation of an understanding latent in public political life and, 
in particular, if against the background of the struggle for a democratic culture in 
 5. As Miller aptly wrote, ‘an institution or practice is neutral when, as far as can reasonable be 
foreseen, it does not favour any particular conception of the good at the expense of others’ (1989, p. 
7; see pp. 72-81).
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the West and later elsewhere, it builds on the distinctive conception of the person 
as a citizen who is, in principle, ‘free and equal’ in a manner ‘comprehensible’ to 
everyone. In other words, the MPA can be understood as a notion embedded in the 
public political culture of democratic societies and emerging democracies.
 The MPA is part of the ‘deep structure’ of ideas which have shaped the cons-
titution of modern political life. It has roots in the ancient world, although many 
elements of its deep structure were not part of classical thinking, marked as the latter 
was by a very restricted view of who could count as a citizen and by a teleological 
conception of nature and the cosmos. It was not until the modern world that the 
MPA became more firmly entrenched (Held, 1996). It became entrenched in the 
pursuit of citizenship, which has always been marked by ‘an urge’, as Marshall put 
it, to secure ‘a fuller measure of autonomy’ for each and every person; for autonomy 
is the ‘stuff ’ of which modern citizenship is made (1973, p. 84). Or, to restate the 
point in the language used hitherto, it has been marked by an urge to realise the core 
elements of an egalitarian conception of the person (with its emphasis upon people 
as free and equal, capable of active agency and accountable for their choices), of 
the democratic regulation of public life (including consent, deliberation, voting and 
inclusiveness) and of the necessity to ensure that, if people’s equal interest in self-
determination or self-governance is to be protected, attention must be focused on 
those who lack the capacity to participate in, and act within, key sites of power and 
political institutions (that is, that there must be a measure of social protection).
 Another way to put these points is to say that the MPA is the guiding political 
thread of modern democratic societies and that the first seven cosmopolitan princi-
ples, suitably unfolded from a commitment to self-determination and autonomy, are 
the basis for specifying more fully the nature and form of a liberal and democratic 
order.6 In short, these cosmopolitan principles are the principles of democratic 
public life, but without one crucial assumption —never fully justified in any case 
in liberal democratic thought, classic or contemporary— that these principles can 
only be enacted effectively within a single, circumscribed, territorially based po-
litical community (see Held, 1995). The cosmopolitan principles do not presume, 
as principle 6 makes clear, that the link between self-determination, accountability, 
democracy and sovereignty can be understood simply in territorial terms. Hence, it 
is possible to have a modern democratic rendition of the Stoic aspiration to multiple 
forms of affiliation —local, national and global. The cosmopolitan principles are 
the core element of democratic public life, shed of the contingent link with the 
borders of nation-states. How these principles should be spliced with organizations, 
institutions and borders of political communities is a separate question, to which 
I will return.
 It could be objected that the language of autonomy and self-determination has 
limited cross-culture validity because of its Western origins. But a distinction must 
 6. I say ‘first seven cosmopolitan principles’ because the eighth, sustainability, has traditionally 
not been a core element of democratic thinking, although it ought to be (see Held, forthcoming).
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be made between those political terms and discourses which obscure or underpin 
particular interests and power systems and those which seek to test explicitly the 
generalizability of claims and interests, and to render power, whether it be political, 
economic or cultural, accountable. What the language of autonomy and self-deter-
mination generates and, in particular, the language of the MPA, is what might be 
thought of as a commitment or pre-commitment to the idea that all persons should 
be equally free —that is to say, that they should enjoy equal liberty to pursue their 
own activities without arbitrary or unwarranted interference. If this notion is shared 
across cultures it is not because they have acquiesced to modern Western political 
discourse; it is, rather, that they have come to see that there are certain languages 
which protect and nurture the notion of equal status and worth, and others which 
have sought to ignore or suppress it.
 To test the generalizability of claims and interests involves ‘reasoning from the 
point of view of others’ (Benhabib, 1992, pp. 9-10, 121-47). Attempts to focus on 
this ‘social point of view’ find their clearest contemporary elaboration in Rawl’s 
original position, Habermas’s ideal speech situation and Barry’s formulation of 
impartialist reasoning (see Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1973, 1996; Barry, 1989 and 
1995). These formulations have in common a concern to conceptualize an impartial 
moral standpoint from which to assess particular forms of practical reasoning. This 
concern should not be thought of as over-demanding. As one commentator aptly 
put it: ‘all the impartiality thesis says is that, if and when one raises questions 
regarding fundamental moral standards, the court of appeal that one addresses is 
a court in which no particular individual, group, or country has special standing’ 
(Hill, 1987, p. 132, quoted in Barry, 1995, pp. 226-7). Before the court suggesting 
‘I like it’, ‘it suits me’, ‘it belongs to male prerogatives’, ‘it is in the best interest 
of my country’, does not settle the issue at hand, for principles must be defensible 
from a larger, human standpoint. This social open-ended, moral perspective is a 
device for focusing our thoughts and testing the intersubjective validity of our 
conceptions of the good. It offers a way of exploring principles, norms and rules 
that might reasonably command agreement. I refer to it as the metaprinciple of 
impartialist reasoning (MPIR).
 The MPIR is a moral frame of reference for specifying rules and principles that 
can be universally shared; and, concomitantly, it rejects as unjust all those practices, 
rules and institutions anchored in principles not all could adopt (O’Neill, 1991). At 
issue is the establishment of principles and rules that nobody, motivated to establish 
an uncoerced and informed agreement, could reasonably discard (see Barry, 1989; 
cf. Scanlon, 1998). In order to meet this standard a number of particular tests can 
be pursued, including an assessment of whether all points of view have been taken 
into consideration; whether there are individuals in a position to impose on others 
in such a manner as would be unacceptable to the latter, or to the originator of the 
action (or inaction), if the roles were reversed; and whether all parties would be 
equally prepared to accept the outcome as fair and reasonable irrespective of the 
social positions they might occupy now or in the future (see Barry, 1989, pp. 372 
and 362-3).
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 The MPIR cannot produce a simple deductive proof of the ideal set of principles 
and conditions which can overcome the deficiencies of a political order; nor can it 
produce a deductive proof of the best or only moral principles that should guide 
institutional development. Rather, it should be thought of as a heuristic device to 
test candidate principles of moral worth, democracy and justice and their forms of 
justification (Kelly, 1998, pp. 1-8; Barry 1998b). These tests are concerned with 
a process of reasonable rejectability, which can always be pursued in a theoretical 
dialogue open to fresh challenge and new questions and, hence, in a hermeneutic 
sense, can never be complete (Gadamer, 1975). But to acknowledge this is not to 
say that theoretical conversation is ‘toothless’ either with respect to principles or 
the conditions of their entrenchment.
 In the first instance, moral impartialism has a crucial critical and debunking 
role. This position is emphasized most clearly by O’Neill (1991). Impartialist rea-
soning, in this account, is a basis for disclosing non-generalizable principles, rules 
and interests, and of showing how justice is a matter of not basing actions, lives or 
institutions on principles that cannot be universally shared. The impartialist vantage 
point has efficacy qua critical stance.
 The principles of coercion and deception are among the principles open to 
serious objection from this perspective. It is impossible for a principle of coer-
cion to be universally shared, for those who are coerced are denied agency and 
so cannot share their coercer’s principle of action. Likewise, it is impossible for 
a principle of deception to be universally upheld because those who are deceived 
cannot adopt their deceiver’s underlying concerns or share the deceiver’s principle 
of action. (If the deceiver’s plan of action was known to all parties, the deception 
could not, of course, work.) Such arguments do not show ‘that all coercion or 
deception is unjust: they show only that actions, institutions and lives which make 
coercion or deception fundamental are unjust’ (O’Neill, 1991, p. 298). Moreover, 
the same line of reasoning can disclose that human beings cannot construct a just 
order based on the neglect of need. For a principle of neglecting need will also 
fail the test of universal adoption. Human beings who sought to adopt such a 
principle would risk failing to meet their own finite, needy states, let alone those 
of others. But how, and to what extent, needs should be met remains unspecified 
in this account.
 Impartialist reasoning, thus understood, is a critical device for disclosing non-
generalizable principles and unjust institutions, but can it state a more positive 
position, which lays down the underlying principles of a just cosmopolitan order? 
I believe something more positive can be disclosed in the pursuit of principles and 
rules that can be universally shared. There is only space here to sketch this thought. 
In this regard, it is my contention that the eight cosmopolitan principles can all 
meet the test of impartiality, and form moral and political elements upon which 
all could act. For they are at the root of the equal consideration and treatment of 
all human beings, irrespective of where they were born or raised. The impartialist 
emphasis on taking account of the position of the other, of only treating political 
outcomes as fair and reasonable if there are good reasons for holding that they 
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would be equally acceptable to all parties, and of only treating the position of 
some socio-economic groups as legitimate if they are acceptable to all people 
irrespective of where they come in the social hierarchy, is consistent with the 
eight principles and does not provide grounds on which they can be reasonably 
rejected. The principles of equal moral status, equal public engagement and the 
public justification of collective institutional arrangements are robust enough not 
to fall foul of these considerations (see Held, forthcoming). 
 Within this theoretical framework, it can be argued that individual or collective 
social arrangements generating serious harm (urgent unmet need) cannot be justi-
fied by reference to a special social standing, cultural identity, ethnic background, 
or nationality —in fact by reference to any particular grouping— if the latter 
sanctions closure or exclusion in relation to the core conditions of human auto-
nomy, development and welfare (see Caney, 2001). To the extent that a domain of 
activity operates to structure and delimit life expectancy and life-chances, deficits 
are disclosed in the structure of action of a political association. These deficits 
can, furthermore, be regarded as illegitimate to the extent to which they would 
be rejected under the conditions of the MPIR. If people did not know their future 
social location and political identity, they would not find the self-interested defence 
of specific exclusionary processes and mechanisms convincing. These justificatory 
structures cannot easily be generalized and are, thus, weak in the face of the test 
of impartiality. Unless exceptional arguments are available to the contrary, social 
mechanisms and processes generating serious harm for certain groups and categories 
of people fall to the requirement of impartiality (see Barry, 1995, 1998a).
 Impartialist reasoning is a basis for thinking about the problems posed by 
asymmetries of power, unevenness of resource distribution and stark prejudices. 
It provides the means for asking about the rules, laws and policies people might 
think right, justified or worthy of respect. It allows a distinction to be made bet-
ween legitimacy as acquiescence to existing socio-economic arrangements, and 
legitimacy as ‘rightness’ or ‘correctness’ —the worthiness of a political order to be 
recognized because it is the order people would accept as a result of impartialist 
reasoning. The latter can be conceived not as an optional element of a political 
and legal understanding, but as a requirement of any attempt to grasp the nature 
of the support and legitimacy enjoyed by particular social forces and relations; for 
without this form of reasoning, the distinction between legitimacy as ‘acceptance’ 
and legitimacy as ‘rightness’ could not be drawn.
 It should be emphasized that the pursuit of impartial reasoning is a social 
activity —not a solitary theoretical exercise. For as Arendt has written:
‘The power of judgement rests on a potential agreement with others, and the 
thinking process which is active in judging something is not… a dialogue between 
me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in 
making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I 
know I must finally come to some agreement… And this enlarged way of thinking… 
cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others ‘in 
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whose place’ it must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration, and 
without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all. (1961, pp. 220-1, as 
cited by Benhabib, 1992, pp. 9-10).’
 The aim of a ‘theoretical conversation’ about impartiality is an anticipated 
agreement with all those whose diverse circumstances affect the realization of 
people’s equal interest in self-determination and autonomy. Of course, as an ‘anti-
cipated agreement’ it is a hypothetical ascription of an intersubjective or collective 
understanding. As such, the ultimate test of its validity must depend in contemporary 
life on the extension of the conversation to all those whom it seeks to encompass. 
Only under the latter circumstances can an analytically proposed interpretation 
become an actual understanding or agreement among others (Habermas, 1988). 
Critical reflection must conjoin with public debate and democratic politics.
 Together the MPA and MPIR provide the grounds of cosmopolitan thought. 
The MPA lays down the conceptual space in which impartialist reasoning can take 
place. For it generates a preoccupation with each person as a subject of equal mo-
ral concern; with each person’s capacity to act autonomously with respect to the 
range of choices before them; and with each person’s equal status with respect to 
the basic institutions of political communities, that is, with an entitlement to claim 
and be claimed upon (see Rawls, 1971, pp. 544-5; Barry, 1989, p. 200). It provides 
motives, reasons and constraining considerations to help establish agreement on 
reasonable terms. The MPIR is the basis for pursuing this agreement. It is a device 
of argument that is designed to abstract from power relations in order to disclose 
the fundamental enabling conditions of active agency, rightful authority and social 
justice. Of course, as a device of argument it can be resisted by those who reject 
the language of autonomy and self-determination; but then we must be clear that 
this is precisely what they are doing.
FROM COSMOPOLITAN PRINCIPLES TO COSMOPOLITAN LAW
 Cosmopolitan law refers to a domain of law different in kind from the law of 
states and the law made between one state and another for the mutual enhancement 
of their geopolitical interests. Kant, the leading interpreter of the idea of such a 
law, interpreted it as the basis for articulating the equal moral status of persons 
in the ‘universal community’ (1970, p. 108). For him, cosmopolitan law is neither 
a fantastic nor a utopian way of conceiving law, but a ‘necessary complement’ to 
the codes national and international law, and a means to transform them into a 
public law of humanity (see Held, 1995, ch. 10). While Kant limited the form and 
scope of cosmopolitan law to the conditions of universal hospitality —the right 
to present oneself and be heard within and across communities— I understand it 
more broadly as the appropriate mode of representing the equal moral standing of 
all human beings, their entitlement to equal liberty and to forms of governance 
founded on deliberation and consent. In other words, cosmopolitan law is the form 
PRINCIPLES OF COSMOPOLITANISM ORDER 167
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 39 (2005), 153-169.
of law which best articulates and entrenches the eight principles of cosmopolitan 
order. If these principles were to be systematically entrenched as the foundation 
of law, the conditions of the cosmopolitan regulation of public life could initially 
be set down.
 Within the framework of cosmopolitan law, the idea of rightful authority, which 
has been so often connected to the state and particular geographical domains, has 
to be reconceived and recast. Rightful authority or sovereignty can be stripped away 
from the idea of fixed borders and territories and thought of as, in principle, an 
attribute of basic cosmopolitan democratic law which can be drawn upon and enac-
ted in diverse realms, from local associations and cities to states and wider global 
networks. Cosmopolitan law demands the subordination of regional, national and 
local ‘sovereignties’ to an overarching legal framework, but within this framework 
associations can be self-governing at diverse levels (Held, 1995, p. 234).
 In this conception, the nation-state ‘withers away’, to borrow an old Marxist 
phrase. But this is not to suggest that states and national democratic polities be-
come redundant. Rather, states would no longer be regarded as the sole centres of 
legitimate power within their borders, as is already the case in many places (Held et 
al, 1999, the Conclusion). States need to be articulated with, and relocated within, 
an overarching cosmopolitan framework. Within this framework, the laws and rules 
of the nation-state would become but one focus for legal development, political 
reflection and mobilization. Under these conditions, people would come, in prin-
ciple, to enjoy multiple ctizenships — political membership, that is, in the diverse 
communities which significantly affect them. In a world of overlapping communities 
of fate, individuals would be citizens of their immediate political communities, and 
of the wider regional and global networks which impacted upon their lives. This 
overlapping cosmopolitan polity would be one that in form and substance reflected 
and embraced the diverse forms of power and authority that already operate within 
and across borders. In this sense, cosmopolitanism constitutes the political basis 
and political philosophy of living in a global age (see Held, 2004).
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